Why appoint judges




















Robust market economies clearly depend on stable, even-handed legal environments. To safeguard neutrality on the bench, states should move from electing to appointing judges — specifically, through nonpartisan commissions that select judges based on merit.

These commissions, which are already in place in two-thirds of states, recruit and recommend eligible nominees for judicial appointments. Dispersing power to appoint members of the commission across a variety of groups — the Governor, legislators from both parties — strengthens the commission's independence.

Appointment-based systems better serve their purpose when complemented by evaluation commissions. In 17 states, such commissions conduct thorough examinations of judges' performance during their terms. Criteria typically include understanding of relevant law, administrative prowess, and judicial temperament.

As one study reports, "public confidence in judicial candidates and the judiciary as a whole is bolstered when voters receive such information through [judicial performance evaluation] programs. In three cases — which came to be known as the Judges Cases — in , and , the Supreme Court evolved the collegium system for appointing judges. A group of senior Supreme Court judges headed by the CJI would make recommendations to the President on who should be appointed. The ruling affirmed the pre-eminence of the executive in making appointments, but was overturned 12 years later in the Second Judges Case.

The court underlined that the deviation from the text of the Constitution was to guard the independence of the judiciary from the executive and protect its integrity. The ruling on this established a quorum and majority vote in the collegium to make recommendations to the President. In , the NDA government attempted to claw back control on judicial appointments by establishing the National Judicial Appointments Commission through constitutional amendments.

Although the law, which gave the executive a greater foot in the door in appointments, had support across political parties, the Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional. In , when it was established, it had 8 judges including the CJI.

Privacy policy About Ballotpedia Disclaimers Login. Partisan elections. Nonpartisan elections. Michigan-Ohio method.

Assisted appointment. Bar-controlled commission. Governor-controlled commission. Hybrid commission. Legislative elections. Gubernatorial appointment. Elections give the people a direct voice in selecting judges and holding them accountable. Party affiliation efficiently communicates candidates' values and ideologies. Partisanship is unavoidable in any selection system. If it doesn't surface in outright political party support, it will surface in other ways.

Partisan elections give special interest groups a foothold to manipulate the judiciary. Voters do not actually understand how partisanship manifests itself in everyday decision making; they often instead base their decisions on hot button political issues.

Nonpartisan elections do not attract as much funding as partisan elections, especially from special interest groups that may wish to sway justice in their favor. Voters do not actually understand how partisanship manifests itself in everyday decision making; in partisan elections, they often base their decisions on hot button political issues. In absence of party affiliation, issue-based campaigning becomes the norm, making isolated rulings on specific issues—often abortion, gay marriage and the death penalty—the centerpiece of judicial campaigns.

Legislative elections were designed to prevent any one authority figure from having too much power. Legislative elections do not function well when the legislature is politically polarized.

Legislative elections promote political "inbreeding" and can potentially create a judiciary primarily made up of past legislators. Gubernatorial appointment of judges. Gubernatorial appointments protect the independence of the judiciary , eliminating the need for political campaigns and insulating the judiciary from special interest groups that may wish to "buy a vote.

Before this appointments were made on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor, who was a Government Minister. It was considered that the appointment process was open to the criticism that a member of the government should not have the sole responsibility for appointing judges. It was also considered that judges were appointed in the image of existing judges rather than solely on merit from a pool of widely drawn eligible candidates.

Despite the criticisms levelled at it the former method of appointment in fact worked rather well. Candidates were selected on merit, there was no question of any political consideration being involved, and the Lord Chancellor usually acted on the advice of the senior judiciary, who were in a position to identify able practitioners.



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